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Abstract
This study examines the relationship between property rights, deﬁned by land tenure security
and the strength of local-level institutions, and household demand for fuel wood, as measured
by the source from which fuel wood is collected. A multinomial regression model is applied to
survey data collected in rural Ethiopia. Results from the discrete choice model indicate that
active local-level institutions increase household dependency on open access forests, while land
security reduces open access forest dependence. However, local-level institutions are found to
reduce the role of private fuel wood sources, while tenure security has not, at least yet, had
any impact on private fuel wood source collection activities. The results suggest that there
is a need to bring more open access forests under the management of the community and
increase the quality of community forestry management in order to realize improvements in
forest conservation.
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1I n t r o d u c t i o n
As in many other developing countries, biomass resources such as fuel wood, dung and agricultural
crop residues, are the most important energy sources in both rural and urban Ethiopia. According to
the Woody Biomass Inventory and Strategic Planning Project (2004), over 90% of the country’s total
energy for household cooking is derived from biomass fuels — 78% from ﬁrewood — while 99.9% of the
total rural population make use of woody and other traditional biomass resources, such as animal
dung and agricultural residues (Zenebe, 2007). Such heavy reliance on biomass energy sources has
resulted in serious forest degradation. Between 1990 and 2010, Ethiopia lost an average of 140,900
ha — 0.93% of its initial forest coverage area — each year.1 Given that all major forests in Ethiopia
are state-owned, while the government, like those in many other low-income countries, has neither
the capacity nor the incentive to properly regulate these forests, such rates of forest degradation may
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1See http://rainforests.mongabay.com/deforestation/2000/Ethiopia.htm. Fuel wood collection, together with land
clearing for agriculture, overgrazing and other shocks (such as ﬁres) also contribute to the unsustainable use and
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1not be that surprising.2 There is de facto open access to all forests, which is expected to aggravate
the degradation and deforestation problems in the country.3 Fortunately, the problem has been
recognized and there is keen interest within government to alleviate or reverse the situation, and
increase forest cover in Ethiopia.
In April 2007, the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development’s (MoARD) Forest Devel-
opment, Conservation and Utilization Policy and Strategy was approved. According to MoARD
(2007), one component of the policy is the provision of seedlings and the granting of certiﬁcates
of ownership to lands designated for forest development. Another policy instrument contained in
MoARD (2007) is the continued extension of land tenure security, since tenure security reduces in-
vestment risk and should promote increased forest sustainability.4 The provision of seedlings is one
of the supply-side strategies adopted by the current government to reduce the pressure on forests and
minimize the problem of land degradation, while the granting of certiﬁcates harnesses both demand-
side and supply-side strategies. However, the success of these policies hinges, in part, on whether or
not households reduce their demand for fuel wood from, especially, open access forests, when private
sources are available, as well as whether or not private ownership and seedlings incentivize better
forest stewardship.
Recent Ethiopian studies have focused on the impact of land certiﬁcation on investment and pro-
ductivity in agriculture (Deininger et al., 2008; Deininger et al., 2009; Holden et al., 2009, Mekonnen,
2009). Deininger et al. (2009), for example, assess the eﬀects of the low-cost land registration pro-
gram in Ethiopia on soil and water investment, ﬁnding that, despite policy constraints, the program
has resulted in increased soil and water related investment. Holden et al. (2009) provide further evi-
dence on the eﬀectiveness of land certiﬁcation on investment. They use a unique balanced household
and plot-level panel dataset covering the ﬁve main zones of the Tigray region in northern Ethiopia
to assess the investment and productivity impacts of the recent low-cost land certiﬁcation. Their
ﬁndings indicate that land certiﬁcation has signiﬁcant positive impacts, including improved mainte-
nance of soil conservation structures, increased investment in trees, and increased land productivity.
Mekonnen (2009) analyses the roles of tenure insecurity and household endowments in explaining
tree growing behaviour in Ethiopia, where farmers cannot sell or mortgage land and factor markets
are imperfect. However, Mekonnen used perceived expropriation of land in the ﬁve-year period after
the survey as an indicator of land tenure insecurity. The results of Mekonnen’s (2009) analysis
suggest that land tenure insecurity inﬂuences the decision to grow trees, but not the number of trees
households grow.
Although the initial MoARD program has received some attention in the literature, that focus has
been on the investment eﬀects of the land certiﬁcation policy. To date, no study has considered the
possible impacts of the program on forestry use, which is the purpose of this research. Speciﬁcally,
this research seeks to provide empirical evidence related to the determinants of household fuel wood
source choices, with a focus on tenure insecurity and local-level institutions.
An u m b e ro fd i ﬀerent fuel wood sources are available in the rural parts of the country. Private
trees or farm forests, state or open access forests, community forests, and markets are the major
sources of fuel wood and other forest products. In terms of use, the wood supplied from open source
forests is mainly used for fuel wood, fencing and construction. However, as previously described,
government policy has attempted to provide incentives for better forestry use and to involve local
people in the management and use of forests and forest products, leading to the development of
community forests. Thus, for the government to achieve its objectives — increasing the contribution
of forests to the economic development of the country, maintaining the ecological balance, as well
2Mekonnen and Bluﬀstone (2007) note that the regulation incentive is particularly low in Ethiopia, because forests
produce goods used mainly by local villagers.
3Forest resource degradation and the misuse of forest resources in Ethiopia, due to the fact that those resources
have been primarily state-owned, is one more example of Hardin’s (1968) tragedy of the commons.
4M o d e l l e do na ne ﬀort in Tigray during the late 1990s, an initial program on land certiﬁcation was undertaken
in the country’s main regions in 2003, with the objective of reducing tenure insecurity and its negative impact on
investment (Deininger et al., 2008).
2as conserving and enhancing biodiversity through the sustainable utilization and development of
forest resources — it is necessary to examine and understand the factors that drive rural households
to collect fuel wood from a given source, and, especially, determine patterns of substitution across
sources.
Though there are some studies on the relationship between biomass production and property
rights regimes in developing countries, the available empirical evidence on household fuel wood
source choices is rather limited. Some of these studies, for example, Jumbe and Angelsen (2006),
who consider Malawi, show a high correlation between the speciﬁc attributes of fuel wood collection
sources (such as area, species, distance to the forest, etc.) and the household’s choice of fuel wood
collection source. Among the three types of fuel wood sources: customary, plantation and forest
reserves, in their study, customary forests and forest reserves are substitutes, while substitution is
more limited between plantation forests and forest reserves. However, Jumbe and Angelsen (2006)
do not examine the role of private sources; markets sources were also not incorporated into the
analysis.5
Unfortunately, only a few researchers have examined the role of private trees. Heltberg et al.
(2000) ﬁnd evidence of substitution between forest fuel wood and private energy sources (like dung,
residues and homestead trees) in India. Based on the ﬁndings from India, Nepal, and Ethiopia,
Cooke et al. (2008) indicate that private trees and trees in common forests are substitutes in the
production of fuel wood for rural households, at least for households owning land. Mekonnen (1999)
studies biomass consumption and production in the East Gojam and South Wollo zones of the
Amhara region of Ethiopia, concluding that consumption of other biomass energy sources, such as
dung and crop residues, will not decrease, when more fuel wood is available.
The available empirical literature focuses on rural energy consumption and production and is
geographically limited, with more emphasis on Asia, particularly India and Nepal. Moreover, the
available empirical evidence does not emphasize the impact of local-level institutions and tenure
security on farmer forestry resource use in Africa. Similarly, Ethiopian studies focus on the role
of tenure security on the farmer’s long-term investment, with a focus on land related investments,
and not on forestry use. Therefore, the purpose of this study is to add to the empirical literature
by considering the determinants of household demand, measured by the choice of fuel wood source,
focusing on tenure insecurity and local level institutions, providing policy implications related to the
management and conservation of forests.
In this study we examine the importance of local-level institutions and land certiﬁcation on
source of fuel wood choices, in order to provide information to policymakers. Our estimation results
indicate that active local-level institutions increase the probability of collection from open access
areas, but reduce collection from private sources. However, although tenure security does reduce the
demand for open access fuel wood, tenure security does not impact household decisions to collect
fuel wood from private sources. The results from this study provide valuable insight for Ethiopia’s
current demand-side and supply-side strategies for addressing rural energy problems and halting the
unsustainable use and exploitation of those resources. The main policy implication, gleaned from the
results, is that there is a need to bring additional open access forests under the management of the
community and increase local awareness related to the rules associated with forestry management,
as well as beneﬁts of improved conservation.
The remainder of the paper is organized in the usual fashion. Section 2 outlines the empirical
approach, which is based on the random utility model and its estimation, via the multinomial logit
regression. The data and study areas are described in Section 3. Empirical results and a discussion
of these results are provided in Section 4, while Section 5 presents concluding remarks.
5Linde-Rahr’s (2003) Vietnamese study, which is similar to Jumbe and Angelsen (2006), ﬁnds strong substitution
between open access and plantation forests.
32M e t h o d o l o g y
Consider a household choosing between ﬁve diﬀerent possible sources of fuel wood for their energy
needs: private (or own sources), community forests, the market, open access forests, or a variety
of sources. Households are assumed to select the fuel source option that maximizes their expected
utility, and, therefore, the household chooses a fuel source based on their preferences and other
factors associated with their options. For the household i faced with J choices, utility of choice j ∈
J can be written as:
Uij = Xiβj + εij (1)
The preceding structure of household i’s utility for choice j is the standard random utility model,
where Uij is the utility derived from the choice, Xi is a vector of explanatory variables that aﬀect the
choice of fuel wood source, εij is a disturbance term and βj is the vector of parameters, coinciding
with the variables that are deemed to inﬂuence utility for choice j. Assuming that choice j is the
preferred fuel wood source, it is assumed that the random utility associated with choice j exceeds
the random utility associated with any other choice h that is not j.
Uij >U ih,j6= h (2)
Depending on the distribution of the disturbance terms, various empirical structures can be ap-
plied. The analytical model followed here is the multinomial logit regression framework.6 Therefore,
the probability that j is chosen is the probability that the random utility of choice j exceeds that
of all other choices.
Pr(Uij >U ih)∀j 6= h (3)
Equation (3) can be further re-arranged, as shown by McFadden (1974).
Pr(Xiβj + εij ≥ Xiβh + εih)
Pr(εih − εij ≤ Xjβj − Xiβh)
Let Yi be the unordered categorical dependent variable that takes on a value of zero or one for
each of the j choices. Assuming that εih − εij has a logistic distribution, the probability for choice






Where Xi are individual-speciﬁcr e g r e s s o r sa n dβj and βh are vectors of coeﬃcients for each
fuel wood source. In this model, the regressors do not vary over choices, such that the model is
consistent with a multinomial logit regression. Since
P
Pij =1 , a restriction is needed to ensure
model identiﬁcation. Hence, we set βJ =0 , so the remaining coeﬃcients can be interpreted with
respect to category J, the base category. In this analysis, that category is private fuel wood. Due to
the complex nonlinearity of the multinomial regression model, the estimated coeﬃcients are diﬃcult
6Because of the need to evaluate multiple integrals of the normal distribution, the probit model has found rather
limited use in this setting (Greene, 2003). The logit model, in contrast, has been widely used in empirical research,
due to its relative ease of estimation. However, the one drawback of the model is the assumption used to derive its
formulation, that all choices are independent of irrelevant alternatives (IIA). However, since the dependent variables
do not vary across alternatives, IIA is not a signiﬁcant problem. It is a much bigger problem in the case of conditional
logit models, in which there are choice-speciﬁc dependent variables. Hausman tests for IIA were considered for each of
the reported multinomial logit regressions. The underlying condition of the test, that the variance matrix is positive
semi-deﬁnite, however, was violated. In other words, IIA is not testable, and, therefore, we report our results under
the assumption that IIA is not a problem in the analysis.
4to interpret. Therefore, interpretation is based upon the marginal eﬀects of the explanatory variables












The marginal eﬀects measure the expected change in the choice probability with respect to a unit
change in the requisite explanatory variable. In the case of a binary independent variable, marginal
eﬀects are determined by the probability with the binary indicator turned on net of the probability
with the binary indicator turned oﬀ.8
3 Data source and descriptive statistics
3.1 Nature and source of the data
The data for the analysis were collected in 2007 from a sample of rural households in the East Go-
jam and South Wollo zones of the Amhara region of Ethiopia. The data are part of a longitudinal
survey conducted through a collaborative research project between Addis Ababa University and
the University of Gothenburg, and ﬁnanced by the Swedish International Development Cooperation
Agency/Swedish Agency for Research Cooperation (Sida/SAREC). The selection of the sites was
deliberate, and ensured variation in the characteristics of the sites, including agro-ecology and veg-
etative cover (Mekonnen, 2009). Households from each site were then selected randomly.9 A total
of 1760 households from 14 sites were interviewed, as part of the survey.
The data includes information on household characteristics, household perceptions regarding land
certiﬁcation and registration, energy collection and consumption, assets, credit, oﬀ-farm activities,
the nature and type of forests and other relevant information. More speciﬁcally, in this study we have
included household characteristics such as the age, the sex and the education level of the household
head. We also include family size, household access to credit, land holdings and livestock ownership.
Land holdings was originally reported in local units and converted into a standard measure (ha).
Similarly, we measure ownership of livestock in terms of tropical livestock units (TLUs). The eﬀect of
gender of the household head enables us to examine whether male- or female-headed households are
more dependent on private, community, open access or other sources of fuel wood. Access to credit
is a dummy variable that refers to whether the household can immediately borrow money from any
source (for example, from banks, micro credit institutions, friends, private lenders, etc). It is also
clear that eﬃcient use of biomass through improved cook stoves aﬀects the time spent in collection of
fuel wood, and, hence, household preferences for diﬀerent sources of fuel wood. Therefore, a dummy
variable denoting ownership of an improved stove is included.
Community surveys were also conducted, which enabled us to use additional information in the
empirical analysis. Villagers’ perceptions about the use and management of natural resources such
as forests, grazing land and water, as well as the use and availability of technologies in local agricul-
ture and land management, the situation regarding infrastructure and services, etc., were gathered
during the ﬁeld survey. This data was then restructured into three community-level variables: a
dummy variable for region, allowing us to capture agro-ecological diﬀerences; the average distance,
in hours, of the kebele (village) from the nearest forest; and a variable indicating the strength of
local institutions.
7For a detailed derivation, see Greene (2003, pp 721-722).
8It is possible that the signs of the coeﬃcients and the marginal eﬀects diﬀer, as the latter depends on the signs
and the magnitudes of the other coeﬃcients.
9The sample sites were selected purposively and households from each site were then selected based on simple
random sampling technique.
5As an indicator of tenure insecurity, a dummy variable, accounting for whether the household
has been awarded a land certiﬁcate, is included. In addition to the examination of tenure insecurity,
we also consider the eﬀect of local-level institutions, especially community-level forestry institutions,
on fuel wood source choices. A number of diﬀerent measures were used in the analysis in order to
examine robustness. Households were asked to rate their perceptions regarding forestry rules and
regulations to four diﬀerent statements on a ﬁve-point scale. Institutional response A refers to any
system that might be in place to control fuel wood collection from communal lands. Institutional
response B refers to limitations that might be placed on fuel wood collected from communal lands.
Institutional response C concerns whether or not kebele oﬃcials follow the people and products
being removed from communal lands. Finally, institutional response D is concerned with penalty
structures that might be in place for dealing with collection beyond quotas. Using these responses,
categorical dummy variables related to perceptions — strongly disagree, disagree, neutral, agree and
strongly agree — were created. Each response was considered in the analysis, although only two are
reported here; see Footnote 12. In addition, an index was constructed from this series of questions.
The responses were aggregated, allowing us to create an average response, as well as an index. The
index is based on a categorization of the average, either relatively strong, if the average is greater
than or equal to three, or relatively weak, if the average is below three.10 Our expectation is that
households, operating within a strong forestry management setting, are constrained in their ability
to collect fuel wood from community forests, and, therefore, are forced to make use of other sources.
Deininger et al. (2009) used the same data to assess the eﬀects of a low-cost land registration program
in Ethiopia, ﬁnding that these institutions increased land-related investments. In our analysis, we
use the data to determine whether or not the institutions aﬀect the choice of fuel wood collection
source.
3.2 Descriptive statistics
The primary interest in this analysis is the choice of location from which households are accessing
their fuel wood, i.e., the determinants of collection source choices. Although household-level variables
are assumed to inﬂuence the choice, the analysis focuses on tenure security and institutions related to
community forestry management, to determine whether these policies and institutions have aﬀected
collection activities at the household level. Similarly, the analysis provides some insight related
to substitution patterns between fuel wood collection sources. In the areas in which data were
collected, there are a number of diﬀerent places fuel wood can be gathered or collected. Although
the majority of households accessed only one location, there were households that accessed more
than one. Therefore, in addition to open access forests, community forests, private forests or market
sources, we included multiple sources as a collection option.11 The source choices, as a proportion of
households, are noted in Table 1. The majority of the households (72.3%) collect their fuel wood from
private sources, while 7.7% of the sampled households collect from community forests and 8.6% of
the sampled households collect from open access (OA) areas. Furthermore, some households satisfy
their fuel wood demand from the market (7.3%). As should be expected, most of the households
buying fuel wood from the market are those with minimal land holdings, as those households are
unable to both plant trees and grow crops for their livelihood (see Table 2).
The remaining summary statistics for the participating households are presented in Table 2, by
source of fuel wood. Household-level variables include the age (in its natural log) of the household
head, a dummy variable capturing whether or not the household head had received any formal
education, another dummy variable capturing the sex of the household head, and a measure of the
size of the household (also in its natural log). In addition to household-level variables, institutional
10Principal Components Analysis was also considered; however, due to the fact that there are only four diﬀerent
questions, it was determined that separate categorical variables could be accommodated, instead.
11Primarily, these are households that used two sources, although a small number of households access more than
two sources (only 0.2% of the sampled households).
6variables and land certiﬁcation, a number of wealth and forestry or market access variables were
included. Wealth variables include a dummy for immediate access to credit (through ﬁnancial
institutions or friends), a dummy capturing whether or not the household was using an improved
biomass cook stove, the size of the household’s land holdings (in the natural log, measured by
hectares), and livestock ownership (also in its natural log, measured in tropical livestock units).
Access variables include the household’s distance from the community forest (in its natural log,
measured in walking time) and the household’s distance from the nearest town (also in its natural
log, measured in walking time). From Table 2, it can be inferred that the characteristics of the
independent variables vary by collection source. However, given the relative closeness of the means
and the size of the standard deviations, across collection source, the calculated means lie reasonably
comfortably within two standard deviations of each other. For that reason, it was not deemed
necessary to separately test diﬀerences in means across the groups. It is, however, possible to test
for diﬀerences in means, either group by group, or through the application of analysis of variance
methods. One-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) is used to determine whether there are any
signiﬁcant diﬀerences between the means of three or more independent (unrelated) groups. Overall
there is suﬃcient evidence that the mean values of most of the explanatory variables are statistically
diﬀerent across the sources of fuel wood (see Appendix Table A1).
4 Results of Econometric analysis
The main purpose of the analysis is to provide insights into demand-side eﬀects, as measured by the
choice of fuel wood source, of land tenure security and community forestry management institutions.
The analysis was undertaken via multinomial logit regression. As there are a number of potential
measures of institutions, a series of similar empirical speciﬁcations were considered, diﬀering only by
institutional measure. Table 3 contains the land security marginal eﬀects from those speciﬁcations,
while Table 4 contains the institutional marginal eﬀects from each of the ﬁve speciﬁcations. Finally,
Table 5 contains the marginal eﬀects related to the other variables included in the analysis for only
one of the models, as the remaining model results were qualitatively similar. Complete marginal
eﬀects estimates from the multinomial logit models are presented in Appendix Tables B1 through
B5.
4.1 Land certiﬁcation
As noted earlier, Mekonnen (2009) and Deininger et al. (2009) examine the relationship between
tenure insecurity and long-term investments in private trees and land, respectively. However, no
studies have considered the impact of security on forest use. Although we expect that greater
security will improve land management, as has been shown previously in the literature, it is not
obvious that improved management has led to reduced demand for open access forest products, or
increased use of privately owned forests. In the reported analysis, security is based on whether the
household reports having a certiﬁcate for its land. The natural log of landholdings is also included
in the analysis to control for the availability of private forests.
Contrary to our expectation, tenure security does not have a signiﬁcant impact on the household’s
demand for fuel wood from its own sources. One possible explanation for the observed limited eﬀect
is that private sources require an initial and sustained investment in forests that has not, yet, led to
signiﬁcantly increased stocks that can be used by households. For example, high levels of poverty
could be associated with high discount rates (not available in the study), and high discount rates
would lead to low levels of investment. However, given Mekonnen’s (2009) and Deininger et al.’s
(2009) ﬁndings, this explanation is less likely. Regardless, additional empirical research on the
role of land certiﬁcation, farmers’ long-term investment decisions and household demand for forest
products, by source, may be required to supplement these ﬁndings.
7The certiﬁcation results also support a less stringent hypothesis. It may, instead, be the case
that land certiﬁcation has not impacted investments enough to allow households to rely solely on
their own sources. According to the results in Table 3, tenure security does increase the probability
that households make use of multiple fuel wood sources, with the estimated marginal eﬀect ranging
from 2.4% to 3.0%. Although land security has not had a massive impact on the demand for fuel
wood from private sources, it has had a signiﬁcant and beneﬁcial impact on the demand for fuel
wood from open access forests, a beneﬁt that is especially positive in terms of forest degradation.
According to this analysis, tenure security signiﬁcantly reduces demand pressures placed on open
access forests. The estimated land security marginal eﬀect ranges from -4.0% to -5.4%, depending
upon which institutional measure is included in the analysis.
The size of the household’s farm or plantation is also an important determinant of the house-
hold’s fuel wood choice. Larger landholdings are found to increase signiﬁcantly the probability that
fuel wood is collected from private sources, while reducing the probability that fuel wood is either
purchased from the market or collected from open access forests. Due to the fact that landholdings
are included in their natural log, the marginal eﬀects can be interpreted as elasticities, although the
resulting elasticities are rather small. In this analysis, doubling land holdings results in a 4.5% to
6.7% increase in the probability of private source collection. On the other hand, a 100% increase in
land holdings results in, approximately, a 2.5% reduction in fuel wood market participation, and a
3.6% to 4.7% reduction in the probability of open access collection activities. Heltberg et al. (2000)
draw similar conclusions in their analysis conducted in India — larger landowners collect less fuel
wood from the commons and produce more fuel wood privately. Similarly, Cooke et al. (2008) argue
that households with little or no land are less able to produce fuel wood themselves.
4.2 Community forestry institutions
As noted previously, survey participants were asked their views on four separate community forestry
institutions. The analysis focuses on responses related to whether or not there was a system in place
for controlling fuel wood collection from communal areas (institutional response A) and whether or
not there was a penalty system in place for dealing with individuals that collected too much fuel
wood from communal areas (institutional response D).12 Respondents were asked to state whether
they strongly disagreed, disagreed, were neutral, agreed or strongly agreed with the statement,
and categorical variables related to the strength of agreement or disagreement were included in the
analysis. In addition, an average across each of the four responses, see footnote 12, as well as a
dummy variable for an average that exceeded three, were considered for purposes of robustness.
Although our results are not uniform across analyses, some generalizations are possible. If the
respondent feels that institutions are relatively stronger — the respondent does not strongly disagree
with the statement, the average response is higher or the average response leans towards agreement
— the probability that the household collects from its own sources is lowered. For example, in Model
III, Institutional Response A, a neutral response is associated with a 20% reduction in the probability
of collection from own sources, while strong agreement is associated with a 12% reduction. On the
other hand, market participation probabilities are generally higher for both the average institute and
the institutional dummy, but not related to speciﬁc institutional responses. Furthermore, relatively
stronger institutions are associated with increased probabilities of collection activities within open
access forests. Finally, there is some evidence that stronger institutions reduce the probability that
households make use of multiple sources.
The eﬀect of institutions on community forest collection activities is the most diﬃcult to gener-
alize. Neutral responses with respect to institutional response A and institutional response D are
associated with increased probabilities of community forest collection participation, and the mar-
12We also considered responses related to whether or not the amount of fuel wood collected from communal lands
was limited and whether or not kebele oﬃcials followed individuals removing forest products from communal lands.
These analyses, which are not presented, but are available upon request, ﬁnd no signiﬁcant institutional eﬀects.
8ginal eﬀect is approximately 10% in both cases. However, when including institutions A and D
simultaneously, neutral responses and agreements to institution D are associated with a 7.1% and
12.1%, respectively, increase in the probability of community forest collection, while agreement with
institution A is associated with a 3.8% decrease in community forest collection probabilities.
In terms of expectations, the preceding results contain a few surprises. The creation of community
forests is expected to create insiders and outsiders, those with access to the community forests
and those without. Therefore, it is not surprising to ﬁnd substitution between community forests
and other fuel wood options, and it is not surprising that stronger institutions lead to increased
substitution. In that sense, the increased reliance on open access forests and fuel wood markets
was expected. The surprise arises from the result that institutional strength is associated with
(a) reduced collection from own and multiple sources and (b) increased collection from community
sources. In other words, the results support the hypothesis that institutions create substitution
away from private sources, rather than from community sources. In terms of policy, the unintended
consequences of an expansion of community forests, in tandem with strong local-level institutional
control, will not help reduce the depletion and degradation of forests and forest products, because
it diverts households away from community forests, which can be properly managed, towards open
access forests. A caveat, however, is necessary. If all open access forests are turned into community
forests, and those community forests are properly managed, our results imply that it is possible that
forest degradation can be alleviated.
4.3 Other determinants of fuel wood collection source
The remainder of the estimation results examine other potential determinants of fuel source choices,
such as those related to various demographic, socioeconomic and environmental factors.13 Household
demographic and socioeconomic characteristics, such as the age, the gender, and the education of
the household head, aﬀe c tt h ec h o i c eo ff u e lw o o ds o u r c ed i ﬀerently. The age of the household head
increases the probability that the household collects from own sources (doubling the age raises the
probability by 16.1%), and lowers the probability that households make use of either the market
or multiple collection sources (doubling the age lowers each of these probabilities by approximately
4.3%). The education of the household head also raises the probability that households collect from
their own sources (by 8.5%), while lowering the probability that households collect from open access
forests (by 3.7%). Possibly, educated household heads are more aware of the importance of forest
conservation and its use in maintaining soil fertility and mitigating climate change eﬀects. Contrary
to Jumbe and Angelsen (2006), household size in our analysis has only positive impacts on the
probability of collection from multiple sources, probably because larger households ﬁnd it easier to
take advantage of more collection opportunities.
Household economic indicators were also included in the analysis. Household assets aﬀect produc-
tion capabilities and preferences, and most studies of this nature include some measure of household
wealth, such as landholdings (Edmunds, 2002), discussed above, and livestock ownership. In addi-
tion to these measures, we chose to include two additional measures: credit opportunities (whether
the household can immediately borrow money from any source) and the use of improved biomass
cook stoves. Regardless of the measure ofw e a l t hu s e di np r e v i o u ss t u d i e s ,e a c hﬁnds that most poor
households cannot aﬀord to buy fuel wood from the market. Therefore, we expect poor households
to depend more on forests owned by government (de facto open access) in order to satisfy their
energy demands. With respect to livestock ownership, the wealth eﬀect was generally as expected.
Speciﬁcally, a 100% (TLU) increase in livestock ownership is associated with a signiﬁcant increase
in the probability of collecting fuel wood from private sources (5.1%), but was associated with a
signiﬁcant reduction in the probability of collecting fuel wood from open access forests and multiple
sources (1.5%) and a reduction in the probability of market purchases (1.3%). Improved cook stoves
provide qualitatively similar results to livestock ownership. Ownership of these stoves is associated
13The marginal eﬀects for each of the remaining models are available in Appendix Tables B1 through B5.
9with an increased probability of privately sourced fuel (10.0%), but is associated with a reduced
probability of openly sourced fuel (5.3%) and multiple sources of fuel wood (4.2%). Credit opportu-
nities, on the other hand, do not have the same eﬀect as other sources of wealth, possibly because
they signal a current wealth shortage, although they might also signal borrowing for investment
purposes. We ﬁnd that credit access reduces the probability of using private sources by 7.4%, but
raises the probability of accessing community forests for fuel wood by 6.0%.
In addition to the preceding set of variables, a number of location-speciﬁc variables, such as the
household’s distance to the nearest town and distance to the nearest forest, as well as a region-speciﬁc
dummy variable, were included in the analysis. As most markets are located in or near towns, it
is not surprising that the distance to town reduces the probability of fuel wood purchase from the
market; a doubling of the distance reduces the probability by 1.2%.14 Similarly, households located
farther from town have a lower probability of collecting fuel wood from community forests (1.9% per
100% increase). We also ﬁnd that the distance from town raises the probability of fuel collection
from open access forests; doubling the distance increases the probability by 4.0%. Surprisingly, the
household’s distance from the nearest forest has no impact on fuel wood source. Overall, these results
provide little evidence in support of other studies (e.g., Heltberg et al., 2000) that people tend to
substitute fuel wood from forests with private fuels as distance to forests increase. In terms of the
regional eﬀect, it was signiﬁcantly related to all sources, other than open access forests. We ﬁnd
that households in East Gojam are less dependent on private sources (11.9%), but more dependent
on community forests (7.4%), market purchases (2.9%) and multiple sources (2.4%), compared to
households in the South Wollo region.
5C o n c l u s i o n
In this paper, we have examined the determinants of rural households’ preferences for source of fuel
wood using a discrete choice model, multinomial logit regression, developed within the context of
random utility. The model has been employed to examine whether socioeconomic and environmental
factors aﬀect rural Ethiopian household choices, with a speciﬁce m p h a s i so nl a n ds e c u r i t ya n d
institutional factors related to the community forestry program that is available in the region. The
analysis was undertaken using data collected from the East Gojam and South Wollo zones of the
Amhara region of Ethiopia.
The primary purpose of the analysis was to consider the importance of local-level institutions and
land certiﬁcation on these choices, in order to provide some information to policymakers, since the
current government of Ethiopia and other organizations working on natural resource conservation
are promoting the transfer of land and forests to local people. In terms of the analysis, institutions
do play a role in household choices, although not completely as expected. Better institutions are
associated with a reduced probability of collecting fuel wood from private sources and multiple
sources, while raising the probability of collecting fuel wood from open access forests and community
forests. With respect to policy, the results are positive, in the sense that community forestry use is
increased under stronger institutions. Unfortunately, the results are also negative, in the sense that
the demand for open access forest resources also increases, in the face of better community forestry
institutions. In other words, there is a need to bring additional open access forests under the
management of the community and increase local awareness regarding the use and rules associated
with forestry management. However, additional research is needed to provide better understanding
of the impact of improved community forestry institutions on private source fuel wood collection.
Land certiﬁcation, on the other hand, is associated with reduced collection probabilities in open
access forests and increased collection probabilities for multiple sources for fuel wood collection.
However, although the literature (Deininger et al., 2009; Holden et al., 2009) suggests that land
14Note that distance to town is measured in terms of walking distance (in hours) from the household’s residence to
the nearest town.
10certiﬁcation is responsible for increased investment in the land’s productivity, through better soil
conservation and the planting of trees, our results suggest that these investments have, as yet, not
resulted in signiﬁcantly increased use of private forests for fuel wood. The lack of signiﬁcance is
likely due to a long investment lag — it is unlikely that trees planted within the last few years have
grown big enough for harvest — however, in terms of policy, the reduced probability of collecting
from open access forests is a positive result, suggesting that land certiﬁcation should be furthered.
Additional empirical research on the role of land certiﬁcation, as well as farmers’ investment and
use decisions may be required to supplement these ﬁndings, especially in terms of understanding the
impact of certiﬁcation on private forestry use.
A number of additional implications can be developed from the analysis. Firstly, the results
suggest that household characteristics, such as age, gender, and the education of the household head
aﬀect the choice of fuel wood source diﬀerently. For example, education is negatively correlated
with the probability of fuel wood collection from open access forests, suggesting that improving
education could lead to improved forest conservation by reducing the demand for fuel and other
forest products from open access areas. The current extension system in Ethiopia may have a role
to play in this regard, if the extension system can undertake useful education interventions related
to forest management and conservation.
Secondly, the choice of fuel wood source also varies between regions, depending on agro-ecological
factors, suggesting that there is a need to consider regional variation when examining household
choices. Thirdly, households with large landholdings and greater livestock ownership are more likely
to collect fuel wood from their own private sources and are less likely to collect from either open access
forests or purchase from the market. Regarding policy, interventions related to forest conservation,
especially in open access areas, would be more likely to succeed, if the interventions are capable of
targeting the poorer households in the region.
Finally, distance matters. The probability of market purchase is increased when households are
closer to town, suggesting that people will depend more on the market as communities become more
accessible. Similarly, the probability of collection from open access areas is increased for households
located farther away from town. Therefore, policies designed to increase the supply of fuel wood, or
at least increase access to town — e.g. through improved transportation networks — will help reduce
fuel wood expenditures and environmental pressures on open access forests.
The results from this study can provide valuable insight for Ethiopia’s current demand-side and
supply-side strategies for addressing rural energy problems, especially policies related to forests and
forest resource conservation, as well as halting, and hopefully reversing, the unsustainable use and
exploitation of those resources. Future studies in this area are necessary, and can provide further
information related to the long-term eﬀect of land tenure security (land certiﬁcation) on farmers’
investment decisions, and the implication of these decisions on rural energy demand and forest
degradation in the region. Although this study provides a number of meaningful insights with
respect to forestry conservation and management, focusing on an application to rural Ethiopian
households, it is likely that the results and policy implications can be generalized to other developing
regions. Importantly, many developing regions have similar forestry structures, in that forests are
owned by the government, and suﬀer from many of the same problems, such as forest degradation
that is continuing (or even accelerating) on a pace that is likely to be unsustainable. Therefore,
even though the analysis focuses on a very speciﬁc region of one country, the similarity of structures
and problems suggests that there is scope for developing or extending these policies in other similar
countries.
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12Table 1: The Proportion of Households by Fuel Wood Collection Source 
 
Source  Mean  SD  
Private Forest  0.723  0.45 
Community Forest  0.077  0.27 
Open Access Forest  0.073  0.26 
Market Source  0.086  0.28 
Multiple Sources  0.041  0.20 
 
 
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics by Fuel Wood Collection Source 
 
VARIABLES  Private  Community  Market  Open Access  Multiple Sources 
                 
ln(age hh head)  3.9183  3.8490  3.7369  3.8745  3.8373 
  (0.0105)  (0.0309)  (0.0392)  (0.0340)  (0.0419) 
Male hh head  0.8650  0.8190  0.8113  0.8105  0.8846 
  (0.0127)  (0.0378)  (0.0543)  (0.0404)  (0.0447) 
Educhh head  0.5014  0.4286  0.4151  0.3579  0.4808 
  (0.0186)  (0.0485)  (0.0683)  (0.0494)  (0.0700) 
ln(hh size)  1.8768  1.8238  1.6850  1.8169  1.9547 
  (0.0136)  (0.0410)  (0.0598)  (0.0448)  (0.0422) 
Credit Access  0.8512  0.9238  0.8868  0.8632  0.9038 
  (0.0132)  (0.0260)  (0.0439)  (0.0354)  (0.0413) 
New Stove  0.7934  0.8000  0.7925  0.6421  0.6346 
  (0.0150)  (0.0392)  (0.0562)  (0.0494)  (0.0674) 
Land Certificate  0.7755  0.8000  0.5849  0.5895  0.8462 
  (0.0155)  (0.0392)  (0.0683)  (0.0507)  (0.0505) 
East Gojam  0.6074  0.7810  0.7547  0.6000  0.7115 
  (0.0181)  (0.0406)  (0.0597)  (0.0505)  (0.0634) 
InstAvg>=3  0.3471  0.2381  0.4151  0.4737  0.4231 
  (0.0177)  (0.0418)  (0.0683)  (0.0515)  (0.0692) 
Institution A  2.5758  2.5714  3.2642  3.1895  2.5000 
  (0.0597)  (0.1500)  (0.2089)  (0.1579)  (0.2338) 
Institution B  3.8251  3.7524  4.1321  3.7895  4.0192 
  (0.0499)  (0.1324)  (0.1661)  (0.1379)  (0.1912) 
Institution C  2.7176  2.8095  2.8679  2.9474  2.6923 
  (0.0553)  (0.1361)  (0.1925)  (0.1600)  (0.2065) 
Institution D  2.5344  2.8000  3.0189  3.2000  2.6154 
  (0.0594)  (0.1473)  (0.2262)  (0.1643)  (0.2365) 
Inst Average  2.9132  2.9833  3.3208  3.2816  2.9567 
  (0.0387)  (0.1026)  (0.1418)  (0.1221)  (0.1501) 
ln(ha)  0.2556  0.2923  -0.2009  -0.0591  0.3062 
  (0.0230)  (0.0677)  (0.0778)  (0.0618)  (0.0935) 
ln(TLU)  1.2344  1.0735  0.2947  0.7610  1.0070 
  (0.0377)  (0.1020)  (0.2148)  (0.1405)  (0.1501) 
ln(dist to town)  0.0492  -0.0046  -0.1697  0.3707  0.1262 
  (0.0334)  (0.0683)  (0.1510)  (0.0798)  (0.1134) 
ln(dist to forest)  0.6191  0.5149  0.7922  0.8294  0.5664 
  (0.0293)  (0.0587)  (0.1126)  (0.0633)  (0.0838) 
           
Observations  726  105  53  95  52 
 
  Source: Data collected in Amhara Region of Ethiopia. Standard Errors in Parantheses.
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Table 3. Land Certification Marginal Effects 
 
VARIABLES  Private  Community  Market  Open Access  Multiple Sources 
Model I - Dummy for Institutional Average 
Land Certificate  0.0006  0.0273  -0.0008  -0.0542**  0.0271* 
  (0.0376)  (0.0240)  (0.0111)  (0.0257)  (0.0139) 
ln(hectares)  0.0577**  0.0066  -0.0260***  -0.0434***  0.0052 
  (0.0260)  (0.0186)  (0.0083)  (0.0139)  (0.0121) 
           
Model II - Institutional Average 
Land Certificate  -0.0119  0.0318  0.0003  -0.0498**  0.0295** 
  (0.0370)  (0.0236)  (0.0107)  (0.0248)  (0.0136) 
ln(hectares)  0.0561**  0.0066  -0.0259***  -0.0418***  0.0051 
  (0.0259)  (0.0187)  (0.0081)  (0.0136)  (0.0122) 
           
Model III - Institution Response A 
Land Certificate  -0.0136  0.0319  -0.0017  -0.0435*  0.0269** 
  (0.0352)  (0.0226)  (0.0118)  (0.0228)  (0.0130) 
ln(hectares)  0.0447*  0.0083  -0.0223***  -0.0363***  0.0056 
  (0.0252)  (0.0182)  (0.0085)  (0.0131)  (0.0115) 
           
Model IV - Institution Response D 
Land Certificate  -0.0178  0.0398*  -0.0053  -0.0420*  0.0254** 
  (0.0357)  (0.0216)  (0.0123)  (0.0238)  (0.0125) 
ln(hectares)  0.0669***  0.0044  -0.0282***  -0.0467***  0.0037 
  (0.0255)  (0.0183)  (0.0085)  (0.0137)  (0.0110) 
           
Model V - Institution Response A and D 
Land Certificate  -0.0176  0.0342  -0.0014  -0.0397*  0.0244* 
  (0.0357)  (0.0230)  (0.0113)  (0.0228)  (0.0126) 
ln(hectares)  0.0600**  0.0052  -0.0252***  -0.0428***  0.0028 
   (0.0255)  (0.0187)  (0.0083)  (0.0130)  (0.0110) 
 
  Source: Marginal Effects from Multinomial Logit Estimates. Standard Errors in Parantheses. 
  *** Significant at 0.001, ** Significant at 0.01, * Significant at 0.05. 
14Table 4. Institutional Marginal Effects 
 
VARIABLES  Private  Community  Market  Open Access  Multiple Sources 
Model I – Dummy for Institution Average 
Institute Average > 3  -0.0225  -0.0155  0.0176*  0.0294*  -0.0091 
  (0.0274)  (0.0191)  (0.0097)  (0.0154)  (0.0127) 
Model II – Institutional Average 
Institute Average  -0.0314**  0.0018  0.0093**  0.0190***  0.0013 
  (0.0128)  (0.0092)  (0.0043)  (0.0069)  (0.0060) 
Model III – Institution Response A 
A: Disagree  -0.0760*  0.0107  0.0034  0.0669*  -0.0050 
  (0.0450)  (0.0280)  (0.0175)  (0.0352)  (0.0159) 
A: Neutral  -0.2063***  0.0977*  0.0181  0.1026  -0.0120 
  (0.0773)  (0.0577)  (0.0292)  (0.0650)  (0.0230) 
A: Agree  -0.0744*  -0.0206  0.0365*  0.0800**  -0.0215 
  (0.0412)  (0.0231)  (0.0198)  (0.0319)  (0.0131) 
A: Strongly Agree  -0.1190***  -0.0148  0.0228  0.1008***  0.0102 
  (0.0434)  (0.0247)  (0.0193)  (0.0349)  (0.0174) 
Model IV – Institution Response D 
D: Disagree  -0.0882*  0.0412  -0.0057  0.0402  0.0124 
  (0.0512)  (0.0384)  (0.0142)  (0.0353)  (0.0216) 
D: Neutral  -0.1235**  0.1176**  0.0008  0.0423  -0.0372*** 
  (0.0584)  (0.0502)  (0.0174)  (0.0395)  (0.0117) 
D: Agree  -0.1030**  0.0506  0.0054  0.0517*  -0.0047 
  (0.0427)  (0.0323)  (0.0140)  (0.0295)  (0.0149) 
D: Strongly Agree  -0.1521***  0.0167  0.0191  0.1089***  0.0075 
  (0.0441)  (0.0296)  (0.0167)  (0.0351)  (0.0162) 
Model V – Institution Response A and D 
A: Disagree  -0.0304  -0.0102  -0.0002  0.0471  -0.0062 
  (0.0452)  (0.0270)  (0.0170)  (0.0334)  (0.0161) 
A: Neutral  -0.1530**  0.0575  0.0181  0.0832  -0.0058 
  (0.0777)  (0.0517)  (0.0293)  (0.0611)  (0.0257) 
A: Agree  -0.0360  -0.0382*  0.0305  0.0666**  -0.0229* 
  (0.0427)  (0.0227)  (0.0199)  (0.0319)  (0.0131) 
A: Strongly Agree  -0.0575  -0.0219  0.0138  0.0558*  0.0098 
  (0.0443)  (0.0260)  (0.0178)  (0.0316)  (0.0187) 
D: Disagree  -0.0771  0.0424  -0.0043  0.0216  0.0173 
  (0.0530)  (0.0417)  (0.0144)  (0.0303)  (0.0249) 
D: Neutral  -0.0968  0.1209**  -0.0039  0.0146  -0.0348*** 
  (0.0601)  (0.0549)  (0.0153)  (0.0310)  (0.0129) 
D: Agree  -0.0920**  0.0714*  -0.0011  0.0198  0.0019 
  (0.0455)  (0.0382)  (0.0126)  (0.0243)  (0.0173) 
D: Strongly Agree  -0.1186**  0.0313  0.0163  0.0650**  0.0061 
   (0.0468)  (0.0348)  (0.0171)  (0.0319)  (0.0176) 
  Source: Marginal Effects from Multinomial Logit Estimates. Standard Errors in Parantheses. 
  *** Significant at 0.001, ** Significant at 0.01, * Significant at 0.05. 
15Table 5. Other Marginal Effects (Model I) 
 
VARIABLES  Private  Community  Market  Open Access  Multiple Sources 
ln(age of hh head)  0.1605***  -0.0501  -0.0435***  -0.0236  -0.0432** 
  (0.0475)  (0.0339)  (0.0156)  (0.0242)  (0.0206) 
Male  -0.0054  -0.0150  0.0058  0.0067  0.0079 
  (0.0399)  (0.0303)  (0.0113)  (0.0184)  (0.0166) 
Education   0.0845***  -0.0262  -0.0100  -0.0368**  -0.0114 
  (0.0277)  (0.0200)  (0.0095)  (0.0150)  (0.0119) 
ln(hh size)  -0.0404  -0.0217  -0.0146  0.0249  0.0518*** 
  (0.0399)  (0.0279)  (0.0120)  (0.0210)  (0.0194) 
Credit Access  -0.0737**  0.0602***  0.0103  -0.0064  0.0096 
  (0.0345)  (0.0203)  (0.0111)  (0.0218)  (0.0158) 
New Cook Stove  0.1003***  0.0030  -0.0010  -0.0607***  -0.0416** 
  (0.0352)  (0.0230)  (0.0112)  (0.0223)  (0.0187) 
East Gojam  -0.1192***  0.0744***  0.0289***  -0.0075  0.0235** 
  (0.0292)  (0.0200)  (0.0101)  (0.0169)  (0.0119) 
ln(TLU)  0.0506***  -0.0079  -0.0126***  -0.0152**  -0.0150*** 
  (0.0134)  (0.0095)  (0.0037)  (0.0063)  (0.0052) 
ln(dist to town)  -0.0142  -0.0185*  -0.0119**  0.0401***  0.0045 
  (0.0162)  (0.0109)  (0.0047)  (0.0104)  (0.0070) 
ln(dist to forest)  -0.0139  0.0017  0.0089  0.0036  -0.0003 
   (0.0208)  (0.0155)  (0.0065)  (0.0110)  (0.0088) 
  Source: Marginal Effects from Multinomial Logit Estimates. Standard Errors in Parantheses. 
  *** Significant at 0.001, ** Significant at 0.01, * Significant at 0.05. 
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Appendix Table A1: Test of Mean Differences via One-way ANOVA 
 
ANOVA  
      Sum of 
Squares  df 
Mean 
Square  F  Sig. 
Dummy for Education  Between Groups  4.129  4  1.032  4.166  0.002 
   Within Groups  381.595  1540  0.248      
   Total  385.724  1544          
size of land  Between Groups  56.432  4  14.108  16.989  .000 
   Within Groups  1278.836  1540  0.83       
   Total  1335.268  1544          
Numberof livestock   Between Groups  619.457  4  154.864  17.773  .000 
   Within Groups  13418.801  1540  8.714       
   Total  14038.259  1544          
Dummy for certificate  Between Groups  4.834  4  1.209  7.568  .000 
   Within Groups  245.942  1540  0.16       
   Total  250.777  1544          
Dummy for region  Between Groups  13.96  4  3.49  14.456  .000 
   Within Groups  371.801  1540  0.241       
   Total  385.761  1544          
Distance of forest   Between Groups  49.575  4  12.394  2.739  0.027 
   Within Groups  6969.413  1540  4.526       
   Total  7018.988  1544          
A dummy for Institutions  Between Groups  10.134  4  2.533  10.393  .000 
   Within Groups  375.39  1540  0.244       
   Total  385.524  1544          
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Appendix Table B1.  
Marginal Effects Estimates – Model I 
 
VARIABLES  Private  Community  Market  Open Access 
Multiple 
Sources 
                 
ln(age hh head)  0.1696***  -0.0591*  -0.0397**  -0.0246  -0.0463** 
  (0.0490)  (0.0342)  (0.0157)  (0.0263)  (0.0224) 
Male hh head  0.0068  -0.0218  0.0069  -0.0026  0.0107 
  (0.0419)  (0.0319)  (0.0113)  (0.0217)  (0.0175) 
Educ of hh head  0.0926***  -0.0262  -0.0114  -0.0426***  -0.0124 
  (0.0284)  (0.0201)  (0.0096)  (0.0161)  (0.0130) 
ln(hh size)  -0.0474  -0.0208  -0.0124  0.0307  0.0500** 
  (0.0409)  (0.0281)  (0.0122)  (0.0225)  (0.0208) 
Credit Access  -0.0823**  0.0557***  0.0117  0.0043  0.0106 
  (0.0351)  (0.0214)  (0.0105)  (0.0215)  (0.0176) 
New Stove  0.1026***  0.0038  0.0005  -0.0630***  -0.0440** 
  (0.0353)  (0.0228)  (0.0109)  (0.0229)  (0.0197) 
Land Certificate  0.0006  0.0273  -0.0008  -0.0542**  0.0271* 
  (0.0376)  (0.0240)  (0.0111)  (0.0257)  (0.0139) 
East Gojam  -0.1182***  0.0803***  0.0306***  -0.0142  0.0215* 
  (0.0298)  (0.0198)  (0.0101)  (0.0182)  (0.0131) 
ln(ha)  0.0577**  0.0066  -0.0260***  -0.0434***  0.0052 
  (0.0260)  (0.0186)  (0.0083)  (0.0139)  (0.0121) 
ln(TLU)  0.0485***  -0.0078  -0.0113***  -0.0138**  -0.0157*** 
  (0.0135)  (0.0096)  (0.0036)  (0.0067)  (0.0056) 
ln(dist to town)  -0.0090  -0.0181  -0.0132***  0.0365***  0.0039 
  (0.0166)  (0.0111)  (0.0046)  (0.0112)  (0.0077) 
ln(dist to forest)  -0.0101  -0.0037  0.0106  0.0014  0.0018 
  (0.0211)  (0.0153)  (0.0065)  (0.0119)  (0.0096) 
InstAvg>=3  -0.0225  -0.0155  0.0176*  0.0294*  -0.0091 
  (0.0274)  (0.0191)  (0.0097)  (0.0154)  (0.0127) 
           
Observations  1,031  1,031  1,031  1,031  1,031 
 
  Source: Marginal Effects from Multinomial Logit Estimates. Standard Errors in Parantheses. 
  *** Significant at 0.001, ** Significant at 0.01, * Significant at 0.05. 
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Appendix Table B2.  
Marginal Effects Estimates – Model II 
 
VARIABLES  Private  Community  Market  Open Access 
Multiple 
Sources 
                 
ln(age hh head)  0.1703***  -0.0586*  -0.0399**  -0.0261  -0.0458** 
  (0.0490)  (0.0344)  (0.0155)  (0.0257)  (0.0226) 
Male hh head  0.0054  -0.0204  0.0064  -0.0031  0.0117 
  (0.0416)  (0.0317)  (0.0112)  (0.0213)  (0.0173) 
Educ of hh head  0.0878***  -0.0253  -0.0109  -0.0399**  -0.0116 
  (0.0285)  (0.0202)  (0.0094)  (0.0159)  (0.0131) 
ln(hh size)  -0.0475  -0.0209  -0.0120  0.0305  0.0499** 
  (0.0407)  (0.0281)  (0.0121)  (0.0221)  (0.0208) 
Credit Access  -0.0755**  0.0550**  0.0107  0.0001  0.0097 
  (0.0358)  (0.0217)  (0.0107)  (0.0220)  (0.0181) 
New Stove  0.1011***  0.0033  0.0009  -0.0609***  -0.0445** 
  (0.0353)  (0.0230)  (0.0107)  (0.0225)  (0.0198) 
Land Certificate  -0.0119  0.0318  0.0003  -0.0498**  0.0295** 
  (0.0370)  (0.0236)  (0.0107)  (0.0248)  (0.0136) 
East Gojam  -0.1230***  0.0815***  0.0313***  -0.0122  0.0224* 
  (0.0298)  (0.0199)  (0.0100)  (0.0178)  (0.0131) 
ln(ha)  0.0561**  0.0066  -0.0259***  -0.0418***  0.0051 
  (0.0259)  (0.0187)  (0.0081)  (0.0136)  (0.0122) 
ln(TLU)  0.0502***  -0.0077  -0.0118***  -0.0149**  -0.0157*** 
  (0.0136)  (0.0096)  (0.0036)  (0.0066)  (0.0056) 
ln(dist to town)  -0.0102  -0.0182  -0.0129***  0.0371***  0.0042 
  (0.0166)  (0.0111)  (0.0046)  (0.0110)  (0.0078) 
ln(dist to forest)  -0.0136  -0.0021  0.0104  0.0027  0.0026 
  (0.0211)  (0.0153)  (0.0064)  (0.0116)  (0.0097) 
Inst. Average  -0.0314**  0.0018  0.0093**  0.0190***  0.0013 
  (0.0128)  (0.0092)  (0.0043)  (0.0069)  (0.0060) 
           
Observations  1,031  1,031  1,031  1,031  1,031 
 
  Source: Marginal Effects from Multinomial Logit Estimates. Standard Errors in Parantheses. 
  *** Significant at 0.001, ** Significant at 0.01, * Significant at 0.05. 
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Appendix Table B3. 
Marginal Effects Estimates – Model III 
 
VARIABLES  Private  Community  Market  Open Access  Multiple Sources 
                 
ln(age hh head)  0.1599***  -0.0508  -0.0450***  -0.0217  -0.0423** 
  (0.0472)  (0.0332)  (0.0161)  (0.0241)  (0.0214) 
Male hh head  0.0079  -0.0191  0.0036  -0.0005  0.0080 
  (0.0406)  (0.0304)  (0.0125)  (0.0197)  (0.0175) 
Educ of hh head  0.0764***  -0.0256  -0.0078  -0.0329**  -0.0101 
  (0.0274)  (0.0195)  (0.0098)  (0.0148)  (0.0123) 
ln(hh size)  -0.0299  -0.0216  -0.0158  0.0167  0.0505** 
  (0.0397)  (0.0276)  (0.0124)  (0.0207)  (0.0199) 
Credit Access  -0.0680*  0.0567***  0.0042  -0.0037  0.0109 
  (0.0351)  (0.0205)  (0.0131)  (0.0215)  (0.0165) 
New Stove  0.1022***  0.0067  -0.0040  -0.0627***  -0.0422** 
  (0.0347)  (0.0220)  (0.0121)  (0.0222)  (0.0189) 
Land Certificate  -0.0136  0.0319  -0.0017  -0.0435*  0.0269** 
  (0.0352)  (0.0226)  (0.0118)  (0.0228)  (0.0130) 
East Gojam  -0.1220***  0.0766***  0.0317***  -0.0103  0.0240* 
  (0.0290)  (0.0196)  (0.0105)  (0.0169)  (0.0124) 
ln(ha)  0.0447*  0.0083  -0.0223***  -0.0363***  0.0056 
  (0.0252)  (0.0182)  (0.0085)  (0.0131)  (0.0115) 
ln(TLU)  0.0499***  -0.0074  -0.0135***  -0.0138**  -0.0153*** 
  (0.0132)  (0.0094)  (0.0038)  (0.0063)  (0.0054) 
ln(dist to town)  -0.0150  -0.0168  -0.0134***  0.0404***  0.0049 
  (0.0160)  (0.0107)  (0.0048)  (0.0104)  (0.0074) 
ln(dist to forest)  -0.0091  -0.0011  0.0058  0.0038  0.0006 
  (0.0203)  (0.0149)  (0.0067)  (0.0108)  (0.0092) 
A: Disagree  -0.0760*  0.0107  0.0034  0.0669*  -0.0050 
  (0.0450)  (0.0280)  (0.0175)  (0.0352)  (0.0159) 
A: Neutral  -0.2063***  0.0977*  0.0181  0.1026  -0.0120 
  (0.0773)  (0.0577)  (0.0292)  (0.0650)  (0.0230) 
A: Agree  -0.0744*  -0.0206  0.0365*  0.0800**  -0.0215 
  (0.0412)  (0.0231)  (0.0198)  (0.0319)  (0.0131) 
A: Strongly Agree  -0.1190***  -0.0148  0.0228  0.1008***  0.0102 
  (0.0434)  (0.0247)  (0.0193)  (0.0349)  (0.0174) 
           
Observations  1,079  1,079  1,079  1,079  1,079 
 
  Source: Marginal Effects from Multinomial Logit Estimates. Standard Errors in Parantheses. 
  *** Significant at 0.001, ** Significant at 0.01, * Significant at 0.05. 
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Appendix Table B4. 
Marginal Effects Estimates – Model IV 
 
VARIABLES  Private  Community  Market  Open Access  Multiple Sources 
                 
ln(age hh head)  0.1637***  -0.0492  -0.0493***  -0.0232  -0.0420** 
  (0.0478)  (0.0333)  (0.0162)  (0.0257)  (0.0206) 
Male hh head  0.0009  -0.0212  0.0056  0.0042  0.0105 
  (0.0405)  (0.0308)  (0.0122)  (0.0199)  (0.0158) 
Educ of hh head  0.0872***  -0.0230  -0.0117  -0.0416***  -0.0108 
  (0.0279)  (0.0195)  (0.0099)  (0.0159)  (0.0119) 
ln(hh size)  -0.0483  -0.0200  -0.0093  0.0286  0.0490** 
  (0.0399)  (0.0271)  (0.0129)  (0.0221)  (0.0192) 
Credit Access  -0.0739**  0.0568***  0.0141  -0.0053  0.0082 
  (0.0348)  (0.0204)  (0.0107)  (0.0224)  (0.0165) 
New Stove  0.0936***  0.0018  0.0008  -0.0560**  -0.0402** 
  (0.0348)  (0.0227)  (0.0113)  (0.0221)  (0.0184) 
Land Certificate  -0.0178  0.0398*  -0.0053  -0.0420*  0.0254** 
  (0.0357)  (0.0216)  (0.0123)  (0.0238)  (0.0125) 
East Gojam  -0.1230***  0.0796***  0.0300***  -0.0092  0.0226* 
  (0.0295)  (0.0196)  (0.0104)  (0.0178)  (0.0120) 
ln(ha)  0.0669***  0.0044  -0.0282***  -0.0467***  0.0037 
  (0.0255)  (0.0183)  (0.0085)  (0.0137)  (0.0110) 
ln(TLU)  0.0508***  -0.0066  -0.0133***  -0.0161**  -0.0148*** 
  (0.0134)  (0.0094)  (0.0038)  (0.0067)  (0.0053) 
ln(dist to town)  -0.0131  -0.0163  -0.0137***  0.0374***  0.0057 
  (0.0162)  (0.0108)  (0.0048)  (0.0108)  (0.0071) 
ln(dist to forest)  -0.0138  0.0024  0.0073  0.0036  0.0006 
  (0.0208)  (0.0149)  (0.0068)  (0.0118)  (0.0088) 
D: Disagree  -0.0882*  0.0412  -0.0057  0.0402  0.0124 
  (0.0512)  (0.0384)  (0.0142)  (0.0353)  (0.0216) 
D: Neutral  -0.1235**  0.1176**  0.0008  0.0423  -0.0372*** 
  (0.0584)  (0.0502)  (0.0174)  (0.0395)  (0.0117) 
D: Agree  -0.1030**  0.0506  0.0054  0.0517*  -0.0047 
  (0.0427)  (0.0323)  (0.0140)  (0.0295)  (0.0149) 
D: Strongly Agree  -0.1521***  0.0167  0.0191  0.1089***  0.0075 
  (0.0441)  (0.0296)  (0.0167)  (0.0351)  (0.0162) 
           
Observations  1,057  1,057  1,057  1,057  1,057 
 
  Source: Marginal Effects from Multinomial Logit Estimates. Standard Errors in Parantheses. 
  *** Significant at 0.001, ** Significant at 0.01, * Significant at 0.05. 
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Appendix Table B5. 
Marginal Effects Estimates – Model V 
 
VARIABLES  Private  Community  Market  Open Access  Multiple Sources 
                 
ln(age hh head)  0.1605***  -0.0501  -0.0435***  -0.0236  -0.0432** 
  (0.0475)  (0.0339)  (0.0156)  (0.0242)  (0.0206) 
Male hh head  -0.0054  -0.0150  0.0058  0.0067  0.0079 
  (0.0399)  (0.0303)  (0.0113)  (0.0184)  (0.0166) 
Educ of hh head  0.0845***  -0.0262  -0.0100  -0.0368**  -0.0114 
  (0.0277)  (0.0200)  (0.0095)  (0.0150)  (0.0119) 
ln(hh size)  -0.0404  -0.0217  -0.0146  0.0249  0.0518*** 
  (0.0399)  (0.0279)  (0.0120)  (0.0210)  (0.0194) 
Credit Access  -0.0737**  0.0602***  0.0103  -0.0064  0.0096 
  (0.0345)  (0.0203)  (0.0111)  (0.0218)  (0.0158) 
New Stove  0.1003***  0.0030  -0.0010  -0.0607***  -0.0416** 
  (0.0352)  (0.0230)  (0.0112)  (0.0223)  (0.0187) 
Land Certificate  -0.0176  0.0342  -0.0014  -0.0397*  0.0244* 
  (0.0357)  (0.0230)  (0.0113)  (0.0228)  (0.0126) 
East Gojam  -0.1192***  0.0744***  0.0289***  -0.0075  0.0235** 
  (0.0292)  (0.0200)  (0.0101)  (0.0169)  (0.0119) 
ln(ha)  0.0600**  0.0052  -0.0252***  -0.0428***  0.0028 
  (0.0255)  (0.0187)  (0.0083)  (0.0130)  (0.0110) 
ln(TLU)  0.0506***  -0.0079  -0.0126***  -0.0152**  -0.0150*** 
  (0.0134)  (0.0095)  (0.0037)  (0.0063)  (0.0052) 
ln(dist to town)  -0.0142  -0.0185*  -0.0119**  0.0401***  0.0045 
  (0.0162)  (0.0109)  (0.0047)  (0.0104)  (0.0070) 
ln(dist to forest)  -0.0139  0.0017  0.0089  0.0036  -0.0003 
  (0.0208)  (0.0155)  (0.0065)  (0.0110)  (0.0088) 
A: Disagree  -0.0304  -0.0102  -0.0002  0.0471  -0.0062 
  (0.0452)  (0.0270)  (0.0170)  (0.0334)  (0.0161) 
A: Neutral  -0.1530**  0.0575  0.0181  0.0832  -0.0058 
  (0.0777)  (0.0517)  (0.0293)  (0.0611)  (0.0257) 
A: Agree  -0.0360  -0.0382*  0.0305  0.0666**  -0.0229* 
  (0.0427)  (0.0227)  (0.0199)  (0.0319)  (0.0131) 
A: Strongly Agree  -0.0575  -0.0219  0.0138  0.0558*  0.0098 
  (0.0443)  (0.0260)  (0.0178)  (0.0316)  (0.0187) 
D: Disagree  -0.0771  0.0424  -0.0043  0.0216  0.0173 
  (0.0530)  (0.0417)  (0.0144)  (0.0303)  (0.0249) 
D: Neutral  -0.0968  0.1209**  -0.0039  0.0146  -0.0348*** 
  (0.0601)  (0.0549)  (0.0153)  (0.0310)  (0.0129) 
D: Agree  -0.0920**  0.0714*  -0.0011  0.0198  0.0019 
  (0.0455)  (0.0382)  (0.0126)  (0.0243)  (0.0173) 
D: Strongly Agree  -0.1186**  0.0313  0.0163  0.0650**  0.0061 
  (0.0468)  (0.0348)  (0.0171)  (0.0319)  (0.0176) 
           
Observations  1,041  1,041  1,041  1,041  1,041 
 
  Source: Marginal Effects from Multinomial Logit Estimates. Standard Errors in Parantheses. 
  *** Significant at 0.001, ** Significant at 0.01, * Significant at 0.05. 
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